The Perfect Crime

A couple of weeks ago, a long time subscriber correctly pointed out that I seemed to be speculating more than usual in my conclusion that JPMorgan was the big buyer of Silver Eagles and had accumulated as many as 300 million oz of silver, including Eagles and bullion. The subscriber noted that I usually relied on hard core facts that could be documented and not on speculation. As it turns out, I believe there are sufficient number of hard facts behind my speculation, but I had failed to point them out. So let me present the facts, as I see them, that point to JPMorgan having amassed the largest physical silver position in history.

First, let me set out what I am suggesting concerning JPMorgan and silver. I’m not suggesting I knew all the facts as they were developing, but I came to see them only afterward with the benefit of hindsight. The facts show that JPMorgan took over Bear Stearns and its concentrated short position in COMEX silver (and gold) in March 2008 when silver was close to $21, the highest level to that point in 28 years. The price of silver fell from that level in an irregular pattern until late 2010, while JPMorgan both decreased (bought back) much of its concentrated short position on sharp price declines and increased its short COMEX silver short position on rallies, as I publicly chronicled all along. At times, JPMorgan’s COMEX net short position exceeded 40,000 contracts or the equivalent of 200 million oz. Such a large concentrated position necessarily controlled the price of silver and was, in fact, manipulative on its face.

Because it controlled the price of silver, JPMorgan profited handsomely on its COMEX manipulation thru 2010 and not even an ongoing five year CFTC investigation interfered with JPM’s control on silver prices. However, in late 2010, investor demand for physical silver caused silver prices to break above the highs of early 2008 and JPMorgan could no longer control the price of silver through excessive paper short selling on the COMEX. Physical silver conditions tightened so much by the end of April 2011 that the price reached nearly $50 and, quite literally, JPMorgan (along with other collusive CME traders) were staring into a financial catastrophe, the same as undid Bear Stearns three years earlier.

But no bailout of JPMorgan was possible in April 2011 and instead, the bank along with interested parties at the CME Group arranged for a disorderly takedown of silver prices, almost assuredly with the approval of US regulatory officials. The disorderly takedown proved successful and the big shorts, particularly JPMorgan, escaped what would have been an epic financial catastrophe had they been forced to cover their massive silver short positions.

It is said that one learns more from failure, especially near disaster, than from success. It is my belief that at the time of JPMorgan’s near catastrophe in being short silver into April 2011 that the bank realized just how limited and critical the supply of silver in the world was and decided to use their near death experience to their advantage. It was at that time that the bank decided to buy as much physical silver as it could in order to profit even more to the upside than it did previously to the downside. Again, it was not possible for me to know this at that time and it has only come to me with the fullness of time and the developing factual evidence. What evidence?

For starters, there is the matter of extraordinary sales of Silver Eagles from the US Mint. Since April 2011, the US Mint has produced and sold 140 million Silver Eagles, more than in any similar period of time, in a price environment that can only be termed putrid and in which sales of Gold Eagles were notably lower. I would estimate that JPMorgan purchased close to half of the 140 million Silver Eagles sold since April 2011. According to very reliable sources on the retail front, general investment demand has been lower over this time, as retail buyers do not buy strongly into a declining price environment in any investment asset. Yet we know for a fact that there has been extraordinary buying of Silver Eagles, even while Gold Eagle sales cooled off notably, so someone had to be buying Silver Eagles.

If there is one thing that JPMorgan is expert at, given that it commands an army of lobbyists and has more government officials in its back pocket than any other entity on the face of the earth, it is the exploitation of US law and regulations. JPMorgan knew that US law dictated that the Mint must produce enough Silver (and Gold) Eagles to meet demand. That law was never intended to allow a single big buyer to demand the extraordinary amount of Silver Eagles that JPMorgan desired to buy, but that’s the purpose behind the exploitation of the law.

The Mint sells Silver Eagles at the prevailing price of silver on the day of the sale. In essence, the COMEX price of silver is the price of silver. By controlling the price of COMEX silver, JPMorgan sets the price at which it will buy Silver Eagles. It’s the perfect crime - JPMorgan sets the price of COMEX silver and then demands as many coins as the Mint and its suppliers can produce, even if that means producing the coins on a 24/7 basis. Hey, that’s the law. And remember when JPMorgan increased its COMEX short position in the summer, assuring that prices were about to drop and what occurred as a result? Sales of Silver Eagles nosedived temporarily and only resumed after prices were brought lower by this crooked bank. This is old stuff – what about some additional evidence that JPMorgan has amassed a massive quantity of physical silver?

When JPMorgan took over Bear Stearns in 2008, its Manhattan precious metals warehouse was not operating. But in May 2011, after the decision was made to accumulate physical silver, the warehouse was activated as a working COMEX-approved silver facility and guess what - after starting with zero silver inventory that warehouse has grown to nearly 50 million oz, the largest of all six COMEX warehouses. You can decide if this was just a coincidence but the most compelling reason to start a warehouse would be to store silver you owned in your own warehouse rather than to pay some other warehouse to store metal you own. The timeline, in any regard, is remarkable.

In 2012, as the custodian for the metal held in the big silver ETF, SLV, JPMorgan physically transferred 100 million oz of silver it was storing in one of its own London warehouses on behalf of the trust to Brinks as a sub custodian. In hindsight, the most plausible explanation was to make room for silver JPM would come to purchase by using the SLV as a means of acquiring physical silver on an undetected and unreported basis as I have been explaining continuously (avoiding the SEC’s 5% share ownership reporting requirement). I believe much more than 100 million oz of silver, perhaps double or triple that amount have been accumulated by JPMorgan using the SLV to transfer metal to its own London warehouses completely undetected and unreported. The details of the London Warehouse transfer can be found here. http://about.ag/slv/

Then there is the matter of the unprecedented physical turnover in the COMEX warehouses. As I have detailed on these pages, this unusual turnover began in April 2011 and not in 2008 when JPMorgan first became the COMEX kingpin and manipulator by virtue of the Bear Stearns takeover. This timeline further supports the decision of JPMorgan to begin acquiring physical silver after its near death experience in April 2011. With so much physical silver flowing into and out from the COMEX warehouses weekly, it would be easy for a big buyer to regularly skim off a continuous share of that physical flow. And this is in complete harmony with my conclusion that the unprecedented COMEX warehouse turnover is to due to tight conditions in that the tight conditions are mainly due to JPMorgan’s accumulation of physical silver.

Back in the late 1970’s the Hunt Brothers accumulated close to 100 million oz of physical silver (and more in futures contracts) and were found to have manipulated the price of silver higher as a result of that accumulation. What makes the much larger accumulation of physical silver by JPMorgan today different is that it is the perfect crime.

The Hunts were outsiders; JPMorgan is the ultimate insider. The Hunts ran afoul of the regulators; JPMorgan owns the regulators. The Hunts’ purchases were widely known; as far as I know, I’m the only one pointing to JPMorgan accumulating massive amounts of physical silver. The Hunts drove prices higher as they accumulated silver; JPMorgan, by virtue of its price control on the COMEX, has been able to accumulate silver on sharply declining prices. Talk about a stacked deck.

Given that JPMorgan has such control over the US regulators and is able to operate in near total secrecy in matters related to physical silver, it’s hard for me to imagine what could foil their perfect silver crime. All that’s missing is JPM selling out at extremely high silver prices. And considering that big banks, in essence, don’t have to report anything they don’t want to publicly report, I would be surprised if JPMorgan would even have to pay taxes if they made the many billions of dollars they seemed destined to make on silver to the upside.

Yes, it is true that I am speculating about JPMorgan and physical silver and that much of this is based upon analysis after the fact; but it was not possible for anyone to predict this in advance without practicing voodoo or communicating with the spirits. As for the evidence surrounding JPMorgan’s decision to accumulate physical silver, I guess you have to believe that all the circumstances revolving around April 2011 were completely coincidental to avoid making the connection.

As always, I can’t give you the exact timeline for the future. If there is much more additional physical silver for JPMorgan to accumulate at lower prices, I’m sure this crooked bank will arrange for those lower prices. But after no more additional silver is available on the cheap, it should be time for JPM to allow prices to climb. One more point - since JPMorgan has been accumulating silver for more than 3.5 years, its average price is considerably north of current prices. Back of the envelope calculations indicate an average price in the mid-$20’s and any profit to the bank would only accrue above those levels. Yes, it grates on me that JPMorgan has been able to illegally accumulate as much silver as I suspect and, most particularly, the manner in which that silver was accumulated; but at some point the accumulation should prove most beneficial to silver investors.

Ted Butler

December 29, 2014